I've wondered about that remark for years now("You've got to understand that this isn't a military weapon,....") and the point in time that it occured at because it always made me consider that Truman had a much more complete understanding of the potential of the Bomb than FDR or that most people give him credit for. I get that Some of that understanding probably came from what Truman learned while the Truman Committee was doing its investigation, but I always had the impression that to FDR the Bomb was just another part of the global conflict that he was trying to manage: a major part to be sure but still just one major part among many. Truman on the other hand understood that the Bomb was in a class separate And beyond anything else that had come before, and that it Ought to be treated in a separate catagory on its own rather than simply as just another weapon in an arsenal.
Truman's idea that the atomic weapon had a purpose different from conventional weapons has always bothered me. I mean, what did he think we were doing when we dropped napalm on cities? Those were cities full of women and children.
I discuss the firebombing situation in the book at some length, but I would say that it is clear that Truman and most others in his administration (and the general press, etc.) saw the atomic bomb and the firebombings as two different kinds of activities. That does not mean that we have to. But if we are trying to understand them historically, they did not see them as equivalent for a variety of reasons. One of the only people in the Truman administration who was deeply disturbed by the firebombings — but not enough to actively try and interfere with them in a serious way — was Henry Stimson, and his concerns about the firebombings became linked to how he interacted with Truman about the bomb. So it is an important part of the story, even though it is clear that Truman (and most others at the time) did not see them as the same kind of events.
Interesting, I never knew that Stimson had any feelings one way or the other about the firebombings. Do you think that he felt that way for moral reasons or because he was taking a longer term statesman's view of what the act would do to American prestige abroad?
He expressed it in terms of moral concerns primarily. He also, at times, expressed it to others in terms of reputational damage, but I suspect those were attempts to sway others more than his own concerns...
My conclusions diverge significantly from Giangreco's, for sure (as do most historians of the bomb, these days).
Gallicchio's concerns are just different ones than mind — my conclusions are not fundamentally in disagreement with his inasmuch as his are not really about what Truman thought he was doing.
My book is not about why Japan surrendered, whether unconditional surrender should have been modified, etc. It is not about whether the atomic bombs should have been dropped. It is about Truman understood about the dropping of the bombs, what he did not understand about them, the few places he was actually involved in the decision-making process, and the long term implications of that beyond World War II. So it is quite different from either of those books, or other books that are focused on the "should the bombs have been dropped?" question.
I don't know _whether_ they should have been dropped — that's not really a historical question. A more historical question is to ask whether they were _necessary_ to end the war, but it's too counterfactual to answer with any confidence, and I don't try to answer it. I am interested in different questions.
You're welcome to read my book with an open mind to see how — or not. It's your choice. But if you're wondering, "does this guy think he has something new to add that contradicts what other historians have written on this?" Yes, that is exactly what I am saying! That is exactly what anyone who publishes a piece of serious research in history, with a novel argument, is claiming.
After I posted here, I found you on Reddit, and from there, found a link to your essay in "The Age of Hiroshima." I'm not convinced of the thesis that Truman was a naif. As far as what he wrote in diaries and other things, versus realities, Giangreco mentioned some "deceptions" from his time as chair of the Truman Committee. If I come across your book at my library, I'll grab it. And, yes, per the last paragraph, you do have a thesis, which is good; many history books are bad about that, either not having one, or else an ill-formed one. I also re-read my review of Gallicchio and he also explicitly talks about Truman not being a naif.
My thesis is not that he was a "naif." It is that he *misunderstood* several conversations he had with Stimson about the nature of the target, was under a *misapprehension* about what he had "decided" to do, and had much more limited understanding of the actual operation underway that he thought he did (and than many other historians attribute to him, largely because they rely on his Memoirs and other after-the-fact justifications). Just to clarify that point. I don't think it has anything to do with his time on the Truman Committee.
I've wondered about that remark for years now("You've got to understand that this isn't a military weapon,....") and the point in time that it occured at because it always made me consider that Truman had a much more complete understanding of the potential of the Bomb than FDR or that most people give him credit for. I get that Some of that understanding probably came from what Truman learned while the Truman Committee was doing its investigation, but I always had the impression that to FDR the Bomb was just another part of the global conflict that he was trying to manage: a major part to be sure but still just one major part among many. Truman on the other hand understood that the Bomb was in a class separate And beyond anything else that had come before, and that it Ought to be treated in a separate catagory on its own rather than simply as just another weapon in an arsenal.
Amazon UK has your book available by the author 'Alexandre Dumas' :)
https://www.amazon.co.uk/Masters-Atomic-Future-Navigated-Responsibility/dp/B0G54HFL6V/ref=sr_1_2?crid=3K4KX9H022PR0&dib=eyJ2IjoiMSJ9.IaNErS8UkBxWWhuqyNYBNUQxLjrahTvCVrFc9VkTmw4.JAeD01xaFIKLH7fHku3yEH4Kviea1G2mkoHKA2q_q-Q&dib_tag=se&keywords=the+most+awful+responsibility&qid=1765699870&sprefix=%22The+Most+Awful+Responsibility%22%2Caps%2C95&sr=8-2
Truman's idea that the atomic weapon had a purpose different from conventional weapons has always bothered me. I mean, what did he think we were doing when we dropped napalm on cities? Those were cities full of women and children.
I discuss the firebombing situation in the book at some length, but I would say that it is clear that Truman and most others in his administration (and the general press, etc.) saw the atomic bomb and the firebombings as two different kinds of activities. That does not mean that we have to. But if we are trying to understand them historically, they did not see them as equivalent for a variety of reasons. One of the only people in the Truman administration who was deeply disturbed by the firebombings — but not enough to actively try and interfere with them in a serious way — was Henry Stimson, and his concerns about the firebombings became linked to how he interacted with Truman about the bomb. So it is an important part of the story, even though it is clear that Truman (and most others at the time) did not see them as the same kind of events.
Thank you for responding
Interesting, I never knew that Stimson had any feelings one way or the other about the firebombings. Do you think that he felt that way for moral reasons or because he was taking a longer term statesman's view of what the act would do to American prestige abroad?
He expressed it in terms of moral concerns primarily. He also, at times, expressed it to others in terms of reputational damage, but I suspect those were attempts to sway others more than his own concerns...
So, what do you have that AM GIangreco, author of "Truman and the Bomb," does not? https://www.goodreads.com/review/show/6923153716
What do you have that Marc Gallicchio of "Unconditional" does not? https://www.goodreads.com/review/show/3640785391
I'm a non-duopoly leftist who does NOT believe that the use of the bomb not only at Hiroshima but also at Nagasaki was some sui generis evil.
My conclusions diverge significantly from Giangreco's, for sure (as do most historians of the bomb, these days).
Gallicchio's concerns are just different ones than mind — my conclusions are not fundamentally in disagreement with his inasmuch as his are not really about what Truman thought he was doing.
My book is not about why Japan surrendered, whether unconditional surrender should have been modified, etc. It is not about whether the atomic bombs should have been dropped. It is about Truman understood about the dropping of the bombs, what he did not understand about them, the few places he was actually involved in the decision-making process, and the long term implications of that beyond World War II. So it is quite different from either of those books, or other books that are focused on the "should the bombs have been dropped?" question.
I don't know _whether_ they should have been dropped — that's not really a historical question. A more historical question is to ask whether they were _necessary_ to end the war, but it's too counterfactual to answer with any confidence, and I don't try to answer it. I am interested in different questions.
You're welcome to read my book with an open mind to see how — or not. It's your choice. But if you're wondering, "does this guy think he has something new to add that contradicts what other historians have written on this?" Yes, that is exactly what I am saying! That is exactly what anyone who publishes a piece of serious research in history, with a novel argument, is claiming.
After I posted here, I found you on Reddit, and from there, found a link to your essay in "The Age of Hiroshima." I'm not convinced of the thesis that Truman was a naif. As far as what he wrote in diaries and other things, versus realities, Giangreco mentioned some "deceptions" from his time as chair of the Truman Committee. If I come across your book at my library, I'll grab it. And, yes, per the last paragraph, you do have a thesis, which is good; many history books are bad about that, either not having one, or else an ill-formed one. I also re-read my review of Gallicchio and he also explicitly talks about Truman not being a naif.
My thesis is not that he was a "naif." It is that he *misunderstood* several conversations he had with Stimson about the nature of the target, was under a *misapprehension* about what he had "decided" to do, and had much more limited understanding of the actual operation underway that he thought he did (and than many other historians attribute to him, largely because they rely on his Memoirs and other after-the-fact justifications). Just to clarify that point. I don't think it has anything to do with his time on the Truman Committee.