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Mark Goodman's avatar

Good analysis that addresses in much more detail some of the issues I raised in a shorter review in the Bulletin (https://thebulletin.org/2025/10/what-we-should-be-talking-about-after-watching-bigelows-a-house-of-dynamite-nuclear-thriller/). One thing I would add is that the movie depicts the "use it or lose it" pressures a President might feel, albeit in a different scenario. Those pressures are the result of choices about our nuclear force structure that are designed to make nuclear deterrence more credible but also make nuclear crises less stable and more dangerous.

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tedd weyman's avatar

Thank you, Alex, for developing this conversation. The Bulletin's debrief on the film was surprisingly tame. You were the guest willing to ask difficult questions. Just as you do above. I actually thought there was an obvious attempt to stuff this in the bag and tamp it down to reassure folks an errant and lose nuke scenario is implausible politically, and more so that the US is better able to defend against it than the movie "reveals" (or at least, claims). It was indecisive in admitting that ICBM missile defense is plausible. That was a missed opportunity for the Bulletin. Particularly in light of the widely published self-promoting successes of anti-sub-sonic US-made missile defenses in Ukraine and Israel. Thus misleading and instilling false hope and technical misrepresentation that ICBM defenses work. To me the most ethical and morally challenging as well and tactically challenging dilemma was the issue of managing escalation and a precipitation of a full scale nuclear outcome. That is still to be explored in the conversation: does a wise and morally responsible President sit tight, wait to see if the nuke is live, if it is a MIRV, wait to get decisive intelligence as to where it actually came from, make the correct decision to absorb the strike, withhold retaliation (until there is knowledge of origin, and reconnaissance of the damage), to determine source motive, and the likelihood of more to come; etc. Does a responsible President, who loves his people and his nation, absorb a single nuke, and decide to never retaliate for the sake of Americans, of all humans and the world? Or does a small minded, hate filled, evil administration make the decision to damn the torpedoes by running head on into Doomsday.

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Bryan Alexander's avatar

Good analysis of the plausibility.

I was thinking of Anne Jacob's _Scenario_, especially the point about the US having to overfly Russia in hitting North Korea.

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ArnoldF's avatar

The movie version of Annie Jacobsen's Nuclear War?

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AG's avatar

I would speculate that the decision to choose this very unlikely and forced set-up of a 1) single ICBM 2) of unknown origin - while pretty unconvincing as a real-life scenario - (none of the geopolitical players named in the movie would ever attempt such an act of insanity and if any such incident would occur all nuclear states would immediately contact the US on various communication lines. Nobody wants WWIII) - was the necessary condition to create a superpower completely caught off-guard and furthermore with its personnel in charge losing their self-confidence.

By comparison other Bigelow narratives were often self-righteous to an insufferable level. But that would not work here. What instead was needed was a "no enemy"-narrative - so the protagonists are being thrown back onto themselves and are helpless and we can actually "pity" them.

When last did you pity the US MIC in a movie without directing your feelings of hate against the usual suspects?

With those suspects in place it might have worked better as a conventional storyline but much more warmongering in tonality - and - jingoist in view. And probably of little artistic value and interest for the creators.

Now there is no enemy but we encounter huge issues with the final episode which affect the entire piece negatively. I do wonder why this was not solved.

Did they address it during writing?

However to make a genuine "anti-nuke-movie" you needed one where there was no classical antagonist. Now how you gonna achieve that? You do an "art movie". In the 1960s critics used to call it "psychological study" which usually meant, there is no plot. (aka the enemy is "within yourself".)

Alternatively I would call this an artistic disaster movie or horror flick à la "JAWS".

But unlike "JAWS" "HOUSE" ends with a whimper. And in "JAWS" there is an enemy of course.

p.s. Another related film might by Andrei Tarkovsky´s "SACRIFICE" (1986). It too evolves around the moment where it all starts and also within a contained narrative.

Swedish with Spanish subs

150 min.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ivTODosMeOQ

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Radbert Grimmig's avatar

As a long time nuke nerd with a background in both science and American studies, this film made me extremely angry. And that is because of the glaring and utterly needless plot holes taking me out of the "suspension of disbelief".

The worst one is how it is bending over backwards to treat a threat that is manifestly NOT a "use them or lose them" situation as if it were.

Call me a nitpicker, call it style over substance but that is an insult to the viewers' intelligence.

If you want a "use them or lose them" situation in your movie, just WRITE ONE into it. Somebody please explain to me why they didn't. It would not have made a single difference to the production costs even. I'm just not gonna point out all the other nonsense here.

And it could have been so impactful. Can probably STILL be. Cause all the people depicted handling the crisis are normal professionals. You know? The type of government officials that have by now all been fired. All that is left currently in the situation room to manage a crisis like this , the people that would take all those decisions under extreme time pressure, are coked-out lunatics, utterly demented Nazi clowns, accelerationist billionaire junkies trying to bring about Christian apartheid apocalypse, and demented old codgers.

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Rick Bolin's avatar

I thought the film was highly political in nature and the main point of the film was “What would a sensible President do in this situation?”. In my mind, and I hope in the minds of others, it makes no sense at all to initiate a global war that might kill billions when you don’t even know who should be attacked. But with the pressures involved in making the most important decision in history in a very short time, who knows what might happen. Hopefully, we elected someone who has thought about the issues beforehand.

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BH's avatar

“Hopefully, we elected someone who has thought about the issues beforehand.” This is a very good point, and maybe the ultimate point of the movie even if the scenario is not the best. In the film there is an exchange between the President and the Secretary of Defense where they talk about getting more training on nominating a Supreme Court justice. I’m afraid the decision makers don’t think about it.

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Michael Dola's avatar

Great review thanks for your work. I agree that it is a compelling, formally innovative (sound design should get an Oscar nom imho) and affecting movie. Jared Harris' SecDef conversation with his daughter made me cry. For whatever reason I was surprised that STRATCOM was thanked in the end credits and I wonder why they would presumably then be ok with this unrealistic 'use it or lose it' scenario where there's no certainty of origin. My most cynical guess is that they are happy if a narrative swirls around the world that the US *will* retaliate, even if it doesn't know who fired first. Nuclear Madman lite? When Failsafe and/or Strangelove came out, didn't the Pentagon or whomever publicly dispute that those movies did not represent an accurate depiction?

Speaking of 'use it or lose it' can anyone explain in what scenario that would actually be operative? Even a full scale attack by Russia would not knock out the submarine platforms who could fire back when they want? I'm not expert obviously so lmk. Also wondering what people thought of the football handler's characterization of the attack code sections as (iirc) "rare," "medium" and "well done." Is that based in any reality? If not then it's a hell of a dramatic license.

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tedd weyman's avatar

I agree with you Michael. "Use it or lose it" is a cute innuendo but hardly realistic and definitely exposes an immoral principle. It stems methinks from the 50's - 70's insanity that was widely propagandized and the view of the Pentagon, that a nuclear war can be won; even though they had 40,000 warheads in play then. The irony is that it really indicates that not only can a nuclear war not be won, it cannot be survived by the parties in play and the war-inflicted climate change might take the rest, afterwards. Its my understanding the ICBM fleet in not the primary power punch of the triad; but rather the submarine fleet that you note, which is not so vulnerable and will be around to mop up after all the strategic bombers and the ballistic missiles are deployed. Subs can put megaton warheads into cities in 10 to 12 minutes. ICBM's are exposed and they take 30". Do you remember one the first Cold War nuclear war movie; it was a true Doomsday plot (at least for the USA): 1959 - "On the Beach" . In that film a sub from a safe area and protected during the hot war went to investigate. It surfaced in (was it?) San Francisco, and there no one was found alive. Gregory Peck, Anthony Hopkins, Fred Astaire and Ava Gardener. I just notices it was remade in 2000.

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Joe Van Cleave's avatar

US SLBM warheads are the W76 at about 100KT and the W88 at about 475 KT. It would take an entire missile’s worth of reentry vehicles to put several MT on one target, depending on the W76/88 ratio on the missile.

Also, until very recently SLBM warheads were considered second-strike weapons because they lacked the accuracy to hit hardened targets like missile silos; they typically targeted population centers. Thus, their effectiveness was based more on the enemy leadership’s willingness to see lots of civilians killed, and were thus less effective at taking out enemy capability. I understand there have been recent upgrades to the Trident D5 that affords it more accuracy, so they now may have an effective first-strike capability.

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AG's avatar

"lacked the accuracy"

What about equipping (almost) the entire force with the super-fuze?

At least as far as Kristensen with Postol wrote in 2017:

"(...)

The new super-fuze dramatically increases the capability of the W76

warhead to destroy hard targets, such as Russian ICBM silos.

We estimate that the super-fuze capability is now operational on all

nuclear warheads deployed on the Navy’s Ohio-class ballistic missile

submarines. The new fuze has also been installed on warheads on

British SSBN.

(...)

"A decade ago, only about 20 percent of US submarine

warheads had hard-target kill capability; today they all do.”

(...)

we conclude that the SSBN force, rather than simply being

a stable retaliatory capability, with the new super-fuze increasingly will be

seen as a front-line, first-strike weapon that is likely to further fuel triggerhappy,

worst-case planning in other nuclear-armed states.

(...)"

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Gregg Herken's avatar

I was surprised to see DEFCON 1 on the board, without presidential authorization. Isn't #1 the order to go to war? Who makes the call on DEFCON?

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Pere Ubu's avatar

As a lay person who admittedly has been interested in nuclear subjects for years, I think what it's doing is partially showing the human aspect of the system is the most fragile, unpredictable part, while also laying out what might happen and asking the audience how they feel about all this. (The ambiguous ending reminds me a hell of a lot of an old educational TV series called "Inside/Out", which ended every episode ambiguously as a prompt for class discussion of what happened.) I also recall seeing an interview with Noah Oppenheim where he specified that he didn't want it to turn into "nuclear war porn", or words to that effect.

I'm glad you mention "The 2020 Commission", because I think it's a similar opportunity to discuss the subject, even if it doesn't skip the bomb effects (but does use authentic comments from survivors, humanizing it while skipping the gory details). I'm part way through Annie Jacobsen's "Nuclear War" which I'm not particularly impressed by, as she does go into macabre detail.

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AG's avatar

Jacobsen - I haven´t read yet but based on her other writings I am very skeptical. (UFOs and Russia???) - however how did you see her actual evidence and the potentially non-partisan views of her interview partners? - how much ideology and how much actual scholarship?

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Nov 7
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newuser210980's avatar

That doesn't make sense though. There is no reason to hold back for a hypothetical second threat when the real, existing threat hasn't been neutralized. If your magazine is depleted against a 2nd strike, what are you worried about, that a missile might get through and hit the 3rd biggest US metro?

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Paul Stone's avatar

Even so, given what they stated was the failure rate, four interceptors would make more sense for a single ICBM.

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