Lots of interesting information in these charts. The most striking thing to me is the US big bomb craze around 1954-1960, when the number of warheads increased by a factor of 10 and the megatonnage by a factor of 60. Then, almost as quickly as it began, it was over: the stockpile growth began to taper off and the average yield went down …
Lots of interesting information in these charts. The most striking thing to me is the US big bomb craze around 1954-1960, when the number of warheads increased by a factor of 10 and the megatonnage by a factor of 60. Then, almost as quickly as it began, it was over: the stockpile growth began to taper off and the average yield went down sharply. It would be interesting to hear your thoughts on what caused this unique period, and why did it end.
Another thing visible in several of the charts is that the Soviet stockpiles seem to follow steady long-term trends while the US ones swing back and forth a lot. Do you think this reflects a real difference, or is it an artifact of data availability? If the Soviet data is less accurate that could hide smaller fluctuations.
Lots of interesting information in these charts. The most striking thing to me is the US big bomb craze around 1954-1960, when the number of warheads increased by a factor of 10 and the megatonnage by a factor of 60. Then, almost as quickly as it began, it was over: the stockpile growth began to taper off and the average yield went down sharply. It would be interesting to hear your thoughts on what caused this unique period, and why did it end.
Another thing visible in several of the charts is that the Soviet stockpiles seem to follow steady long-term trends while the US ones swing back and forth a lot. Do you think this reflects a real difference, or is it an artifact of data availability? If the Soviet data is less accurate that could hide smaller fluctuations.