On the question of Poland’s borders, this probably reflects the US’ rejection of Soviet territorial claims from both before and after WWII. For a long time, for example, the US did not accept the absorption of the Baltic states into the SU. Official US maps showed them as independent states. I think it was the Helsinki Accords that ended this practice.
The United States never recognized the Soviet annexation of the Baltic states, not even after the Helsinki Accords. This was a policy established by the Welles Declaration, itself an application of the Stimson Doctrine, which was a policy of non-recognition of unilateral territorial changes that was originally a response to the creation of the Japanese puppet state of Manchukuo.
The US also did not recognize the Oder-Neisse Line (the de facto eastern border of Germany) as a de jure border, arguing that that it was an administrative boundary and that the final borders of Germany could only be established in a final peace settlement.
But the US did recognize the Soviet annexation of Finnish, Polish, Czechoslovak, and Romanian territories - that is to say, the Soviet Union's other territorial gains along its western border, Kaliningrad excepted - because those annexations were the result of treaties. That these treaties were less than voluntarily entered into by the non-Soviet signatories didn't matter much; after all, gaining legal title to a territory by signing a treaty with a defeated foe or vulnerable neighbor was something the US had itself done in the past and was soon going to do with Japan.
To my knowledge, there was no serious planning in the US on what would happen to the borders of the USSR in the event of its military defeat. That's the sort of thing you start to consider when victory is on the horizon. For comparison, the US did not commit itself to Korean independence until the Cairo Declaration, in November of 1943, and that's even though FDR had declared the goal to be unconditional surrender back in January.
What there was, was lobbying by ethnic organizations in the US that had their own ideas on what should happen to those territories. They had some successes, but nothing that influenced diplomatic posture. At one point or another during the Cold War, there were Polish, Belarusian, Ukrainian, Georgian, and Romanian governments-in-exile, and unlike the claims of Baltic independence, Washington never granted recognition to any of them; so why recognize their territorial claims? Besides, territorial issues were the one thing these organizations were bound to fail to agree on. Ask an anti-communist Lithuanian, an anti-communist Pole, an anti-communist Belarusian, and an anti-communist Russian from the early Cold War who Vilnius rightfully belongs to, and you'll get the same answer: "To us, of course!"
I'd be interested to see what the other side (USSR) was saying. I've been told the USSR's plans were quite good, detailed, and not very offensive in nature (most particularly in the 1960s, when they couldn't have attacked if they'd wanted to... oh, well).
“We have got to do something about the conception that we must wait until Russia hits us before we can start shooting. … By all previous definitions, we are now in a state of war with Russia. Whether we call it a cold war or apply any other term, we are not winning. … It would not be a preventative war, because we are already at war.”
-Letter from previous head of SAC (ca. 1948) Gen. George C. Kenney to General Hoyt S. Vandenberg (29 April 1950)
----------
"We won. Now we finnish them."
-President George H. Bush, spoken personally to the president of France and German chancellor when they questioned their need for continuing cold war era levels of NATO spending after the USSR broke up ca. 1991.
Interesting comment from Kenny at that time given that the sneak attack on Pearl Harbor had occured only about eight and a half years before he wrote it: definately an indication of just how much things had changed in those few years.
A very informative post. Two minor corrections: Kenney served as commander of SAC until 1948, not 1958 (he was LeMay's predecessor); Charles Cabell was director of intelligence for the entire Air Force (1948-51), not just SAC. In 1953 Cabell became deputy director of the CIA and served until January 1962--JFK forced him out, along with Allen Dulles and Richard Bissell, after the Bay of Pigs.
On the question of Poland’s borders, this probably reflects the US’ rejection of Soviet territorial claims from both before and after WWII. For a long time, for example, the US did not accept the absorption of the Baltic states into the SU. Official US maps showed them as independent states. I think it was the Helsinki Accords that ended this practice.
No and also no.
The United States never recognized the Soviet annexation of the Baltic states, not even after the Helsinki Accords. This was a policy established by the Welles Declaration, itself an application of the Stimson Doctrine, which was a policy of non-recognition of unilateral territorial changes that was originally a response to the creation of the Japanese puppet state of Manchukuo.
The US also did not recognize the Oder-Neisse Line (the de facto eastern border of Germany) as a de jure border, arguing that that it was an administrative boundary and that the final borders of Germany could only be established in a final peace settlement.
But the US did recognize the Soviet annexation of Finnish, Polish, Czechoslovak, and Romanian territories - that is to say, the Soviet Union's other territorial gains along its western border, Kaliningrad excepted - because those annexations were the result of treaties. That these treaties were less than voluntarily entered into by the non-Soviet signatories didn't matter much; after all, gaining legal title to a territory by signing a treaty with a defeated foe or vulnerable neighbor was something the US had itself done in the past and was soon going to do with Japan.
To my knowledge, there was no serious planning in the US on what would happen to the borders of the USSR in the event of its military defeat. That's the sort of thing you start to consider when victory is on the horizon. For comparison, the US did not commit itself to Korean independence until the Cairo Declaration, in November of 1943, and that's even though FDR had declared the goal to be unconditional surrender back in January.
What there was, was lobbying by ethnic organizations in the US that had their own ideas on what should happen to those territories. They had some successes, but nothing that influenced diplomatic posture. At one point or another during the Cold War, there were Polish, Belarusian, Ukrainian, Georgian, and Romanian governments-in-exile, and unlike the claims of Baltic independence, Washington never granted recognition to any of them; so why recognize their territorial claims? Besides, territorial issues were the one thing these organizations were bound to fail to agree on. Ask an anti-communist Lithuanian, an anti-communist Pole, an anti-communist Belarusian, and an anti-communist Russian from the early Cold War who Vilnius rightfully belongs to, and you'll get the same answer: "To us, of course!"
I'd be interested to see what the other side (USSR) was saying. I've been told the USSR's plans were quite good, detailed, and not very offensive in nature (most particularly in the 1960s, when they couldn't have attacked if they'd wanted to... oh, well).
“We have got to do something about the conception that we must wait until Russia hits us before we can start shooting. … By all previous definitions, we are now in a state of war with Russia. Whether we call it a cold war or apply any other term, we are not winning. … It would not be a preventative war, because we are already at war.”
-Letter from previous head of SAC (ca. 1948) Gen. George C. Kenney to General Hoyt S. Vandenberg (29 April 1950)
----------
"We won. Now we finnish them."
-President George H. Bush, spoken personally to the president of France and German chancellor when they questioned their need for continuing cold war era levels of NATO spending after the USSR broke up ca. 1991.
----------
And here we are today.
Interesting comment from Kenny at that time given that the sneak attack on Pearl Harbor had occured only about eight and a half years before he wrote it: definately an indication of just how much things had changed in those few years.
It is "a day that will live in infamy" when THEY do it to US.
If WE do it to THEM? That's clearly different. Like US + Israel attacking Iran, no problemo.
The Soviet-Finnish border is also pre-WW2. Finland has not had coastline at Ladoga since 1944.
my fellow Nova Scotian, George Kenney, was only commander of SAC briefly, till 1948
A very informative post. Two minor corrections: Kenney served as commander of SAC until 1948, not 1958 (he was LeMay's predecessor); Charles Cabell was director of intelligence for the entire Air Force (1948-51), not just SAC. In 1953 Cabell became deputy director of the CIA and served until January 1962--JFK forced him out, along with Allen Dulles and Richard Bissell, after the Bay of Pigs.